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ABSTRACT
This review deals with the potential role of Commissions and Inquiries into deliv-
ering a just service to patients from ethnic minorities. It takes as an example the 
experience of people with inflammatory bowel disease and the National Health 
Service in the United Kingdom. Although there are many legal safeguards, the 
avenues open to groups of patients who experience discrimination, are limited and 
generally ineffective. Government inspired responses such as Commissions and 
Inquiries are inadequate and not fit for purpose.
Key words: Discrimination, Healthcare, NHS, Commissions, Inquiries, Judicial 
Review
INTRODUCTION
Ethnic discrimination in delivery of health care is a worldwide problem. Well-
known examples include the notorious Tuskegee experiment where the US Public 
Health Service withheld appropriate treatment for syphilis from more than 600 
African American share croppers between 1932 and 1972.2 However, the issue 
was and is much more widespread than the Deep South. In 1988 Kjellstrand 
demonstrated that non-White patients were half as likely to receive a kidney 
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transplant across the USA.3 Similarly, Black patients were twice as likely to go 
untreated for bladder cancer.4 By the end of the 20th century it was well recog-
nised within the USA that Black patients were less likely than White patients 
with a comparable disease burden to undergo cardiac revascularisation, leading 
to lower survival rates.5 In 1998 Bhopal from Newcastle summarised the effect of 
discrimination on health care in the USA and drew attention to similar issues in 
the UK.6
EXAMPLES OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE DELIVERY  
OF CARE IN THE UK
In 1998 a study from Leicester had shown that South Asian patients admitted into 
coronary care units received poorer care than their European counterparts.7 Such 
differences in the nature of the support and treatment offered to patients from 
ethnic minorities in the UK continue to be reported. Black women with breast 
cancer were less likely to have surgery and more likely to be simply offered 
chemotherapy, whilst Pakistani women were less likely to be offered radiotherapy 
or hormone treatment than White women.8 In the UK in the 21st-century ethnic 
minority patients on the renal transplant register are still less likely to receive a 
donor organ than White patients.9 In the field of mental health, Black service users 
tend to be given injectable depot treatments rather than offered tablets or cognitive 
3 CM Kjellstrand, ‘Age, sex and race inequality in renal transplantation’ (1988) 148 
Archives of Internal Medicine 1305. 
4 WJ Mayer and WP McWhorter, ‘Black/White differences in non-treatment of bladder 
cancer patients and implications for survival’ (1989) 79 American Journal of Public Health 
772. 
5 ED Peterson and others, ‘Racial variation in the use of coronary – revascularization 
procedures. Are the differences real? Do they matter?’ (1997) 336 New England Journal 
of Medicine 480. 
6 R Bhopal, ‘Spectre of race and racism in health and health care: lessons from history 
and the United States’ (1988) 316 British Medical Journal 1970. 
7 JT Lear and others, ‘Myocardial infarction and thrombolysis: a comparison of the 
Indian and European populations on a coronary care unit’ (1994) 28 Journal of the Royal 
College of Physicians (London) 143.
8 RH Jack, EA Davies and H Møller, ‘Breast cancer incidence, stage, treatment and 
survival in ethnic groups in South East England’ (2009) 100 British Journal of Cancer 
545.
9 U Udavaraj and others, ‘UK Renal Registry 16th annual report: chapter 6 demographics 
and outcomes of patients from different ethnic groups on renal replacement therapy in the 
UK’ (2013) 125 Nephron Clinical Practice 111.
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behavioural therapy.10 Although such differences are not policy driven it seems 
unlikely that they are due to overt racism. In a study of nine NHS trusts with 
significant South Asian populations only three were significantly less likely to 
provide expensive biologic therapy for South Asian patients with Crohn’s disease.11 
In one of these trusts, a separate study found that South Asian patients with ulcer-
ative colitis experienced sub-standard care over a 10-year period when compared 
to White British patients.12 This included being seen less often by consultants, less 
frequent investigations and being discharged more frequently. There was no 
evidence that they had milder disease as they needed surgery as often as White 
British patients.
National Health Service (NHS) workers have shown patients various forms of 
discrimination. For example, a qualitative study of 30 registered nurses working in 
hospitals in Leeds identified racism affecting their practice in their care of 
Pakistani patients.13 Earlier a small group of South Asian inpatients had described 
how they felt that they needed to fit into what they described as an ‘English place’.14 
In Middlesbrough, only 5 per cent of Pakistani patients were told of the availability 
of professional translators to help with consultations.15 Problems with effective 
communication between district nurses and South Asian patients meant compliance 
with treatment regimes was not fully understood and assessments of patients’ 
ongoing needs were inaccurate.16 NHS England recognised the importance of this 
issue in a policy statement directed at ensuring that a high quality interpreting and 
10 J Das-Munshi, D Bhugra and MJ Crawford, ‘Ethnic minority inequalities in access to 
treatments for schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders: findings from a nationally 
representative cross-sectional study’ (2018) 16 BMC Medicine 55.
11 A Farrukh and JF Mayberry, ‘Ethnic variations in the provision of biologic therapy for 
Crohn’s disease: a Freedom of Information study’ (2015) 83 MedicoLegal Journal 104.
12 A Farrukh and J Mayberry, ‘Patients with ulcerative colitis from diverse populations: 
the Leicester experience’ (2016) 84 MedicoLegal Journal 31.
13 JD Cortis, ‘Meeting the needs of minority ethnic patients’ (2004) 48 Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 51. 
14 V Vydelingum, ‘South Asian patients’ lived experience of acute care in an English 
hospital: a phenomenological study’ (2000) 32 Journal of Advanced Nursing 100. 
15 R Madhok, A Hameed and R Bhopal, ‘Satisfaction with health services among the 
Pakistani population in Middlesborough, England’ (1998) 20 Journal of Public Health 
Medicine 295.
16 K Gerrish, ‘The nature and effect of communication difficulties arising from 
interactions between district nurses and South Asian patients and their carers’ (2001) 33 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 566.
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translation service was available.17 Unfortunately the Care Quality Commission 
has shown this is often not readily available with hospitals making use of limited 
telephone translation services and non-professional staff.18
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AND  
POTENTIAL RESPONSES
Over the last 20 years a substantial body of evidence has demonstrated that there 
is significant discrimination in the way health care is accessed and delivered by 
the NHS. This discrimination has an ethnic basis and can have a direct impact on 
morbidity and mortality. The studies have been conducted on cohorts of patients 
and used epidemiological techniques. Individual cases have not been reported in 
the medical literature and when, and if, litigation has been contemplated it is likely 
such cases were settled prior to any trial on a no admission of liability basis and 
have included clauses about confidentiality. However, there is also evidence that 
discrimination based on ethnicity is not universal and so provides hope that appro-
priate interventions, including legal ones, might change such behaviour patterns. 
Indeed Sir William MacPherson summarised the situation by suggesting:
It is incumbent on every institution to examine their policies and the outcomes 
of their policies and practices to guard against disadvantaging any section of 
our communities… There must be an unequivocal acceptance of institutional 
racism and its nature before it can be addressed.19
This review will investigate the potential role of judicial processes in dealing 
with discrimination in the delivery of care, as education, non-legal interventions 
and published research alone have failed. The routes to obtaining a more just 
delivery of care will be considered and patients with inflammatory bowel disease 
will act as a model. However, the observations will apply across the board and in 
17 NHS England, ‘Principles for high quality interpreting and translation services 
(Version 1.19)’ <www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2015/ 
03/it_principles.pdf> accessed 4 November 2018.
18 Care Quality Commission, University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust Quality Report 
(2014) <www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/new_reports/AAAA0708.pdf> accessed 
4 November 2018.
19 Home Office, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm4262–1, 1999) 109 </assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/277111/4262.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
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some areas all groups will be considered together. The major approaches that 
will be discussed will be Royal Commissions, Inquiries and Judicial Review.
POTENTIAL LEGAL APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF  
DISCRIMINATION IN DELIVERY OF CARE TO BLACK  
AND ETHNIC MINORITIES
The information available on discrimination in delivery of care to Black and Ethnic 
Minorities (BEM) is almost exclusively based on qualitative social research and 
quantitative epidemiological studies. There is no evidence publicly available of indi-
viduals who have sued in tort or contract where breach of duty has been linked to 
racism in the UK. To some degree this contrasts with the situation in the USA where 
at a press conference called by the Medical Committee for Human Rights, Dr 
Martin Luther King said: “Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the 
most shocking and the most inhuman because it often results in physical death.”20 
He went on to accuse the American Medical Association of a “conspiracy of inac-
tion” with a call for court action against doctors to enforce the Civil Rights Act.21
ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH IN UK
In 1987 the Commission for Racial Equality found that 40 per cent of white 
doctors and 50 per cent of BEM doctors working across England believed there 
was discrimination in the NHS which affected people’s health.22 Subsequently 
Ahmad et al. reported that general practitioners held negative attitudes about 
Asian patients, considering them to require more time and be less compliant.23
The issues in question are what approaches might be taken to change the 
situation for the BEM population as a whole and how should individuals who have 
experienced poor care and suffered injury – the classic breach of duty and causation 
scenario – be best advised.
20 Associated Press, ‘King berates medical care given negroes’ Oshkosh Daily 
Northwestern (Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 26 March 1966) <www.hcdi.com/2018/01/12/
dr-martin-luther-king-on-health-care-injustice> accessed 7 May 2020.
21 J Hoberman, Black and Blue. The Origins and Consequences of Medical Racism 
(University of California Press 2012) 27.
22 L Kushnick, ‘Racism, the National Health Service, and the health of Black people’ 
(1988) 18 International Journal of Health Service 457.
23 WIU Ahmad, M Baker and E Kernohan, ‘General practitioners perceptions of Asian 
and non-Asian patients’ (1991) 8 Family Practice – An International Journal 52.
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HOW TO DEAL WITH POOR CARE FOR  
THE BEM POPULATION
The issue of poor care due to ethnicity is unacceptable nationally and so should be 
dealt with at that level. Indeed, as most data relate to qualitative or large popula-
tion studies, such an approach may be the only effective way in which any progress 
can be made.
The three main routes which might be followed are: a Royal Commission, a 
Public Inquiry or a Judicial Review.
1. Royal Commissions
Royal Commissions are set up by government in the name of the Crown to advise 
in a non-partisan way on controversial issues of national importance. They are 
usually concerned with broad policy issues and generally take between two and 
four years to deliver a report. They have dealt with health issues, but their use has 
declined over the last 30 years. An example of such a commission was in the long-
term care of the elderly.24 However, its effectiveness was limited by a dissentient 
note of two members who considered the proposals financially unrealistic and its 
main recommendation was rejected by the government.25
2. Public Inquiries
During the last 20 years Public Inquiries have become significant tools for investi-
gation of accountability. In healthcare this has included the BSE and the Shipman 
Inquiries.26 Beer has argued their purpose is to identify precisely what happened, 
24 S Sutherland, Royal Commission on Long Term Care. With Respect to Old Age 
(Stationery Office 1999) 1.
25 R Stout, ‘Response to Royal Commission on long term care’ (2000) British Medical 
Journal 315 <bmj.com/rapid-response/2011/10/28/response-royal-commission-long-term-
care> accessed 7 May 2020.
26 L Phillips, The BSE Inquiry (The Stationery Office 2000) 1 <webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060802142310/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk> accessed 7 May 
2020; J Smith The Shipman Inquiry (The Stationery Office 2005) 1 <https://www.pslhub.
org/learn/investigations-risk-management-and-legal-issues/investigations-and-
complaints/investigation-reports/other-reports-and-enquiries/the-shipman-inquiry-2002-
2005-r867/> accessed 7 May 2020.
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
57
decide why it happened and who was to blame and also to identify what can be 
done to prevent it happening again.27
All statutory inquiries are now regulated by the Inquiries Act 2005. In s 2(1) it 
limits the remit of an Inquiry so it may not “rule on, and has no power to determine, 
any person’s civil or criminal liability”. However, in s 2(2) it states “an inquiry 
panel is not to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by any likelihood of 
liability being inferred from facts that it determines or recommendations that it 
makes”.
The public have greatest trust in Inquiries chaired by doctors and nurses.28 
However, in any Inquiry into why patients from ethnic minorities receive poorer 
quality care, members of these two professional groups would have an obvious 
conflict of interest. An example where a Public Inquiry into health service issues 
was chaired by someone without a healthcare background was that led by 
Professor Kennedy into paediatric cardiac surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary.29 
Its probing nature had a significant impact on health care in the UK. It identified 
a “club culture” amongst surgeons with a lack of insight into their clinical 
failings.30 This situation is all too reminiscent of the care experienced by BEM 
patients. As a direct result of the inquiry some 16 years later NHS England set as 
its objectives:
Securing the best outcomes for all …..
Tackling variation ….
Improving patient experience.31
Unfortunately, this standard was only for paediatric cardiac surgery services.
27 J Beer, ‘Introduction’ in J Beer, J Dingemans and R Lissack, Public Inquiries (OUP 
2011) 1. 
28 Institute for Government, ‘General trust in the professions of individuals who have 
chaired public inquiries since 1990’ (2017) <instituteforgovernment.org.uk/charts/general-
trust-professions-individuals-who-have-chaired-public-inquiries-1990> accessed 7 May 
2020.
29 Department of Health, Learning from Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into 
children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 (Cm 5207 – 1, 2001) 1.
30 C Dyer, ‘Bristol Inquiry condemns hospital’s “club culture” ’ (2001) 323 British 
Medical Journal 181.
31 NHS England, ‘Action to implement recommended standards nationally to be announced 
next week’ (2016) <england.nhs.uk/2016/06/childrens-heart-surgery-standards/> accessed 
7 May 2020.
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3. Judicial Review
Lord Donaldson MR in R v Lancashire County Council ex p. Huddleston 
described the role of judicial review in the 21st century as “a new relationship 
between the courts and those who derive their authority from public law, one of 
partnership based on a common aim, namely the maintenance of the highest 
standards of public administration”.32 There is a contractual duty of candour 
imposed on all providers of services to NHS patients in the UK to give them all 
necessary support and relevant information in the event of a reportable patient 
safety incident, which could have or did result in moderate or severe harm or 
death. The fact that the duty exists where harm “could” have been caused would 
suggest that once clinicians become aware their unit is delivering sub-standard 
care, they are under a professional, and probably legal, obligation to inform BEM 
patients individually. Such patients would need to be told their care will be compa-
rable to that of an English patient if they go to a different NHS Trust which serves 
all communities equally. In individual cases, any sub-standard care with adverse 
consequences would be actionable, under the tort of negligence.
Of course, such racist attitudes should have been dealt with by the Trust’s 
management as it contravenes the first “right” under the NHS Constitution:
The NHS provides a comprehensive service, available to all irrespective of 
gender, race, disability, age, sexual orientation, religion, belief, gender 
reassignment, pregnancy and maternity or marital or civil partnership status. 
The service is designed to improve, prevent, diagnose and treat both physical 
and mental health problems with equal regard. It has a duty to each and every 
individual that it serves and must respect their human rights. At the same time, 
it has a wider social duty to promote equality through the services it provides 
and to pay particular attention to groups or sections of society where 
improvements in health and life expectancy are not keeping pace with the rest 
of the population (Italics added for emphasis).33
The abuse experienced by elderly patients at Stafford Hospital led to a Public 
Inquiry and successful claims against Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
based on wilful negligence and contravention of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Human 
Rights Act (1998). Nevertheless, it is more likely individuals who have experienced 
poor care and suffered damage will continue to seek compensation through the 
32 [1986] 2 All ER 941.
33 Department of Health, The NHS Constitution – The NHS belongs to us all (Williams 
Lea 2015) 2.
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traditional route of medical negligence claims. However, judicial review has a 
clear role to play in deciding whether a public body has made its decisions in an 
arbitrary or thoughtless way. The traditional purpose of judicial review has been to 
examine the legality of decisions made by government or by its agents. A victory 
by a claimant can have various outcomes, but in relation to discrimination an 
NHS trust could be required to change its policies so as to eliminate inequitable 
care.
HOW TO DEAL WITH POOR CARE FOR INDIVIDUALS  
FROM THE BEM POPULATION
Poor care for patients from the BEM population is both a breach of duty of care 
and of professional duty. The General Medical Council’s (GMC) equivalent of a 
Core Duty in Good Medical Practice at Domain 4 s59 states:
You must not unfairly discriminate against patients or colleagues by allowing 
your personal views to affect your professional relationships or the treatment 
you provide or arrange. You should challenge colleagues if their behaviour 
does not comply with this guidance.34
The guidance clarifies that it includes: “your views about a patient’s or 
colleagues lifestyle, culture or their social or economic status, as well as the 
characteristics protected by legislation”.35 The GMC enlarges on the consequences 
of a doctor’s personal beliefs and attitudes and states he or she must not: “treat 
patients unfairly, … deny patients access to appropriate medical treatment or 
services, …. not cause patients distress”.36 Although this latter guidance largely 
relates to situations where doctors have a conscientious objection to providing 
certain procedures, such as termination of pregnancy and male circumcision, it is 
also directly relevant to work in a Trust which underserves members of the BEM 
community. Failure to inform patients that a Trust has been underserving the BEM 
could form grounds for referral to a Fitness to Practice Committee. If the complaint 
34 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice <gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/
ethical-guidance-for-doctors/good-medical-practice/domain-4---maintaining-
trust#paragraph-59> accessed 7 May 2020.
35 ibid.
36 General Medical Council, Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice 4 <gmc-uk.org/
ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/personal-beliefs-and-medical-practice/
personal-beliefs-and-medical-practice> accessed 7 May 2020. 
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is upheld by the Medical Practitioners Tribunal this could lead to either suspension 
or permanent erasure of that doctor from the medical register.37
However, none of these actions will compensate a patient or family members 
for poor treatment which has caused harm. The most effective route for seeking 
financial redress in such a situation remains through the tort of negligence. In this 
case the issue of why a patient received sub-standard treatment is of limited 
importance, rather it is whether they received such treatment and how it compares 
with that provided by a competent practitioner.
ROYAL COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION  
OF BEM HEALTHCARE
In 1085 William the Conqueror instituted the first Royal Commission when he 
sent commissioners throughout the country to collect data which would constitute 
the Domesday Book. Its purpose was to record property holdings and this concept 
of investigating and reporting on a specific matter remains the essence of Royal 
Commissions, although they now lack the enforcement powers which William 
gave to his commissioners.
In the UK the executive initiates Commissions through powers delegated to it 
by the Crown. Starr has pointed out that most recent Royal Commissions have 
been concerned with broad policy rather than specific issues requiring timely 
actions.38 As a result there has been only one recent example dealing with health 
issues. This was the Royal Commission on the National Health Service, which 
commenced work in 1976 and delivered its report three years later. Its terms of 
reference were to consider “the best use and management of financial and 
manpower resources of the National Health Service”.39 What remains unclear is 
“why, on some occasions, are the recommendations of advisory bodies accepted 
and implemented with alacrity while at other times they are side-lined, buried or 
wilfully ignored?”40 Owens went on further to suggest that “the authority of the 
37 General Medical Council, Fitness to Practice Procedures <whatdotheyknow.com/
request/223973/response/564046/attach/html/3/Apok%206512%20response.pdf.html> 
accessed 7 May 2020.
38 G Starr, ‘Public inquiries in the United Kingdom’ in S Prasser and H Tracey (eds), 
Royal Commissions & Public Inquiries: Practice & Potential (Connor Court Publishing 
Pty Ltd 2014) para 3.01.
39 A Merrison, Royal Commission on the National Health Service: Report (HMSO 1979) 1.
40 S Owens, ‘Experts and the Environment: The UK Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution 1970-2011’ (2012) 24 Journal of Environmental Law 1.
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advice and its interplay with interests, institutions and power” were important 
factors, but with time these tended to diminish.
1. Royal Commissions and Health Issues
Despite such apparent restrictions, the Royal Commission on the National Health 
Service took a wide view of its remit and considered its work must be informed by 
the notion that the NHS was “a service to patients”.41 Almost 40 years later, obser-
vations made in the report continue to be relevant and this emphasises the poten-
tial long-term value of Royal Commissions. For example, it took the view that it 
should: “have some comments on the way NHS priorities are determined. First, 
we believe it is important that the lay public should be involved in the process”.42
However, the BEM community were viewed as contributing to the difficulties 
of the NHS rather than being a group who were underserved. These views were 
reflected in the following extracts:
7.53 Some of these symptoms are due to economic decline and the 
accompanying poverty and social problems, but others may arise from the 
high cost of accommodation or the special demands of an aged, migrant or 
homeless population.43
7.61 The special needs of patients who come from ethnic minorities require 
sensitive handling by the NHS. The evidence we took from their representatives 
suggests that many NHS workers are not aware of cultural, language, literacy 
and dietary problems which may affect these groups.44
Although the issues of the BEM community only figured in a relatively small 
way in this report, during recent years they have come more to the fore. The 
question, however, is whether they would be considered sufficiently broad and of 
such importance as to warrant a Royal Commission investigating the issue over a 
period of years and at considerable expense.
The Royal Commission on the NHS was initiated under a Labour government, 
but its report was published when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister and 
most of its recommendations were not implemented. This underlines the major 
weakness of Commissions which is that their recommendations lack legal force. 
41 ibid para 1.1.
42 ibid para 6.7.
43 ibid para 7.53.
44 ibid para 7.61.
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However, recently Saatchi (2017) has suggested that there is a growing appetite for 
the appointment of a Royal Commission to sort out the current problems of the 
NHS:
As a constitutional mechanism, a Royal Commission is uniquely placed to 
draw attention to some of the enormous, long-term challenges that many 
members of the public, and Westminster, are not fully aware of. A Commission’s 
investigatory powers, and capacity to provide evidenced-based review free 
from the constraints of the immediate political cycle, allow it to craft solutions 
that command the support of practitioners and politicians alike. When set up 
properly, its recommendations carry a unique legitimacy that could be essential 
to securing a lasting, bipartisan settlement on the NHS.45
Within the issues Saatchi considered most pressing was that of underserved 
BEM communities within the UK. If he is correct that there is a bipartisan wish 
within Parliament to see a Royal Commission to deal with these issues then it 
could become a reality.
2. Mechanisms for a Royal Commission
Royal Commissions are created by a formal Order in Council and confirmed with 
the Great Seal.46 Subsequently an advertisement is placed by the Privy Council in 
The Gazette which can: “specify the leader of the commission to be appointed, or 
an invitation to submit evidence to the inquiry or other matters pertaining to royal 
commissions”.47 Its membership will generally be selected incrementally and 
eclectically from amongst experts and lay people.48 Clearly the composition of 
any Royal Commission concerned with discrimination in the delivery of health 
care would be critical and need to represent those whom the NHS is meant to 
serve.
Royal Commissions lack statutory power to compel witnesses to attend and 
for documents to be disclosed, but their strength lies in the formality of the 
45 M Saatchi, An NHS Royal Commission. From Fighting Fires to Lasting Settlements 
(Centre for Policy Studies 2017) 14.
46 TJ Lockwood, ‘A History of Royal Commissions’ (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
172.
47 ‘Appointment of Royal Commissions (1112)’ <www.thegazette.co.uk/all-notices/
content/121> accessed 7 May 2015.
48 PA Thomas, ‘Royal commissions’ (1982) 3 Statute Law Review 40.
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proceedings and the prestige of being conducted under a royal warrant.49 Although 
the median time to produce a report is between two and four years, at least a 
dozen commissions have done so more rapidly,50 although time would not be a 
factor in this case.
3. Public Inquiries and BEM Healthcare
Howe (1999) described the purpose of inquiries as being to provide “a full and fair 
account of what happened especially in circumstances where the facts are disputed, 
or the course and causation of events is not clear”.51 This is directly relevant to 
discrimination in delivery of care to BEM communities which Trusts and individ-
ual doctors dispute and its cause is unclear. A more cynical interpretation of their 
role has been put forward by Habermas who considers their purpose is to 
re-establish and justify state authority, and thus to maintain ‘the requisite level of 
mass loyalty’52 In similar vein, Brown believes such “public discourse depoliticizes 
disaster events, legitimates social institutions, and lessens anxieties by concocting 
myths that emphasize our omnipotence and capacity to control”.53
In 2005 the Inquiries Act established statutory inquiries and in 2006 the 
Inquiry Rules were published. Non-statutory inquiries continue, however, and are 
still used by a variety of organisations including the NHS. The choice as to which 
of these two forms an inquiry will take often appears quite arbitrary.
STATUTORY PUBLIC INQUIRIES
The Inquiries Act 2005 enables a Minister to create an inquiry:
1 (1) ….. where it appears to him that
 (a)  particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public 
concern
49 AW Bradley and KD Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (13th edn, 
Longman 2003) 305; JS Caird, ‘Public Inquiries: non-statutory commissions of inquiry’ 
(2016) 02599 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 20.
50 P Barlow, ‘The lost world of royal commissions’ (2013) <instituteforgovernment.org.
uk/blog/lost-world-royal-commissions> accessed 7 May 2020.
51 G Howe, ‘The management of public inquiries’ (2002) 70 The Political Quarterly 295. 
52 J Habermas, Legitimation crisis (Beacon Press 1973) 46.
53 A Brown, ‘Authoritative Sensemaking in a Public Inquiry Report’ (2003) 25 
Organization Studies 952.
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The chairman, its membership and final terms of reference are determined by the 
minister. He must inform Parliament of his actions, but does not require its permis-
sion or approval. Therefore, such Inquiries are under the control of the Executive. 
Hence their role in investigation of discrimination in the delivery of care by the 
NHS might be undermined. However, there is some hope. In 2018, an independent 
public statutory inquiry into the use of infected blood was set up. Its terms of 
reference are:
To examine the circumstances in which men, women and children treated by 
National Health Services in the United Kingdom (collectively, the “NHS”) were 
given infected blood and infected blood products, in particular since 1970.54
Clearly the role of the NHS will be investigated, but it must be remembered it 
has taken almost 50 years to arrive at this point, and this included the non-statutory 
Archer Inquiry in 2009.55 This inquiry was funded privately by individuals, the 
Southern Building Company and the Professional Footballers Association.56 Its 
fate is a salutary lesson as it went offline and became difficult to access. As Whyte 
(2010) has pointed out even a statutory inquiry “is a legally sanctioned forum that 
has no power of legal sanction”.57 
1. Statutory Inquiries and Health Issues
However, statutory inquiries can limit the information which they publish under s 
25 when there is:
(5) (b)  any risk of harm or damage that could be avoided or reduced by with-
holding any material;
 (c)  any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired 
information that he has given to the inquiry.
(6) In subsection (5)(b) “harm or damage” includes in particular—
 (a) death or injury58
54 <infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/Terms-of-Reference-Infected-Blood-
Inquiry.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
55 Independent Public Inquiry: Contaminated Blood & Blood Products <archercbbp.com/
public> accessed 7 May 2020.
56 Archer Report 2009 <factor8scandal.uk/archer-report-2009> accessed 7 May 2020.
57 D Whyte, ‘Don’t Mention the Motive for War’ (2010) 82 Criminal Justice Matters 8.
58 The Inquiries Act 2005.
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All medical information is confidential and many patients would feel that they had 
suffered further harm on discovering that they had received less appropriate care 
than other UK citizens.
A further major limitation of statutory inquiries is that: “2 (1) An inquiry 
panel is not to rule on, and has no power to determine, any person’s civil or 
criminal liability”.59 This has significant implications for recipients of infected 
blood and would have similar consequences for any inquiry into discrimination in 
delivery of healthcare.
Under s 19 of the Act restrictions can be imposed by a minister on disclosure 
or publication of evidence provided to the inquiry as well as limiting public 
attendance. Public acknowledgement of discrimination in delivery of care might 
be seen by the Executive as a matter which would not allay public concerns and so 
lead to suppression of any relevant evidence or its publication. For such reasons, 
many judges, such as Saville L, would decline to chair inquiries held under the 
Act.60 To some degree this may explain the limited number of inquiries held under 
the Act and the continuing popularity of non-statutory inquiries. In addition, 
Elliott has drawn attention to the belief that when a judge does chair an inquiry 
into matters of public concern there will be greater accountability and clearer 
evidence of independence from the Executive.61 Clearly, when a minister controls 
the processes of an inquiry these beliefs would be seriously undermined.
Other statutory inquiries related to health have included the Cdiff Inquiry, the 
Vale of Leven Inquiry, the Penrose Inquiry on infected blood in Scotland and the 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry.62 The Cdiff Inquiry was chaired 
by the Chief Medical Officer for Wales and its three other members were all from 
medical backgrounds. It was concerned with an outbreak of Clostridium difficile 
induced diarrhoea in hospitals in Northern Ireland and was linked to 31 deaths. 
The report is no longer readily available. In contrast the Vale of Leven Inquiry 
which was chaired by a retired judge, MacLean L, is still available. It too concerned 
the death of 34 patients from Clostridium difficile and was set up by the Scottish 
government in response to public pressure. The same is also true for the Penrose 
Inquiry into Hepatitis C/HIV infection acquired from infected blood supplies in 
Scotland, where the chairman was a Scottish Court of Session judge.
59 The Inquiries Act 2005.
60 Beer (n 27) 25.
61 M Ellliott, ‘Should judges lead public inquiries?’ (2014) <publiclawforeveryone.
com/2014/07/10/should-judges-lead-public-inquiries> accessed 7 May 2020.
62 G Cowie and M Sandford, ‘Statutory Commissions of Inquiry: the Inquiries Act 2005’ 
(2018) SN06410 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 32.
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2. Statutory Inquiries and Public Pressure
In the case of the Vale of Leven Inquiry pressure came from families of those who 
had died in the Clostridium difficile outbreaks, as well as senior members of the 
medical profession for a public statutory inquiry. However, the turning point was 
an exchange between Nicola Sturgeon, who was Cabinet Secretary for Health and 
Wellbeing, whilst standing in for the First Minister, and Iain Gray at First Minis-
ter’s Question Time:
The families of those who died want a public inquiry now. Britain’s leading 
epidemiologist wants a public inquiry now. This Parliament voted for a public 
inquiry in September. Ms Sturgeon has admitted today that there is no reason 
why that cannot happen. She herself is the only obstacle. How many people 
need to tell her that she is wrong before she calls a public inquiry?63
Although the report was robust in its criticisms, interested parties still accused 
it of being an example of the NHS investigating itself.64 Nevertheless, it specifically 
stated: “Scottish Ministers bear ultimate responsibility for NHS Scotland and even 
at the level of the Scottish Government the systems were simply not adequate.”65
3. Statutory Inquiries and Politics
In 2004 Sir Robert Francis, a barrister with significant experience of chairing 
inquiries, submitted a Memorandum to the Public Administration Select Commit-
tee which was deliberating on the Inquiries Act, in which he suggested that the 
benefits of public inquiries “must be weighed against the burdens that inquiries of 
any public nature place on those who are party to them, and the public in general”.66 
Amongst the burdens he identified were the anguish of victims, the workload 
placed on public bodies and the impact on staff under investigation, as well as 
cost. He went on to chair a non-statutory inquiry into the Mid Staffordshire Foun-
dation Trust and was subsequently appointed by the Labour government to chair a 
63 First Minister’s Question Time Meeting of the Parliament 20 November 2008, session 3, 
col 2168.
64 S Carrell, ‘Inquiry blames hospital for Cdiff deaths’ <theguardian.com/society/2008/
aug/08/mrsa.nhs> accessed 7 May 2020.
65 L MacLean, The Vale of Leven Hospital Inquiry Report (APS Group 2014) 412.
66 R Francis, ‘Memorandum by Robert Francis QC’ (GBI 06) in House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee, Government Inquiry. Written Evidence (The 
Stationery Office Ltd 2004).
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more wide-ranging non-statutory inquiry into what had gone wrong at the Trust. 
However, Andrew Lansley, as Secretary of State for Health in the Coalition 
Government, decided it should be a statutory public inquiry. He gave as his 
reasons:
This was a failure of the trust first and foremost, but it was also a national 
failure of the regulatory and supervisory system, which should have secured 
the quality and safety of patient care. Why did it have to take a determined 
group of families to expose those failings and campaign tirelessly for 
answers?67
However, the decision was probably political. Indeed there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that Public Inquiries usually have political motives behind 
them, whether in response to growing public clamour or, as was suggested by 
Marr about the Scott Inquiry set up by John Major: “The administration was so 
lacking in authority that it was protecting itself, for the time being, with the 
borrowed authority of Lord Justice Scott. The tougher the judge, the stronger the 
shield.”68 Significant support for such a view comes from the experimental work of 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan on a web-based study of 474 UK citizens.69 Apart from blame 
avoidance the breathing space resulting from the inquiry process allows the 
significance of the event to move down the public agenda and so potentially limit 
the need for any active interventions. Against such a background Black and Mays 
have drawn attention to the formal absence of any method of assessing the impact 
of inquiries compared to their cost,70 in other words whether they represent “value 
for money”.
4. Statutory Inquiries and the BEM Community
Pressure groups, such as Cure the NHS, Tainted Blood and Factor 8, have been 
instrumental in bringing long-term pressure on governments to launch public 
inquiries into health issues. In the case of underserved ethnic minority groups a 
67 HC Deb 9 June 2010, vol 511, col 333.
68 A Marr, ‘Behold the backlash, sabres drawn’ The Independent (8 June 1995) 
<independent.co.uk/voices/behold-the-backlash-sabres-drawn-1585410.html> accessed 
7 May 2020. 
69 R Sulitzeanu-Kenan, ‘If they get it right: an experimental test of effects of the 
appointment and reports of UK public inquiries’ (2006) 84 Public Administration 623.
70 N Black and N Mays, ‘Public inquiries into health care in the UK: a sound basis for 
policy- making?’ (2013) 18 Journal of Health Service Research & Policy 129.
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public inquiry will only be achieved through persistent, targeted and informed 
tactics. Recruitment of politicians and public figures as influential supporters is 
central to a successful approach.
The question then arises as to how likely it is that patients with disparate 
diseases from a range of minority communities could come together and develop 
such a strategy. Interestingly inquiries related to health issues have usually 
concerned one group of patients, such as haemophiliacs, or those infected by 
Clostridium difficile. In the case of infected blood products it affected thousands 
of people, whereas the two inquiries concerned with deaths from Clostridium 
difficile involved less than 70 patients.
Assuming that a substantial pressure group developed amongst BEM patients 
and the executive considered the issue of sufficient consequence to set up an 
inquiry what would be important aspects? Clearly chairmanship of the inquiry 
and its membership would be critical. The chair would ideally be a judge and 
membership should include those with legal, cultural and epidemiology 
backgrounds. Although choice of membership lies with the minister, it is the 
chairman, with advice from the inquiry solicitor and counsel, who designates core 
participants.71
5. Statutory Inquiries, the BEM Community and Core Participants
Core participants are defined in s 5(2) of The Inquiry Rules 2006 as:
a. the person played, or may have played, a direct and significant role in relation 
to the matters to which the inquiry relates;
b. the person has a significant interest in an important aspect of the matters to 
which the inquiry relates; or
c. the person may be subject to explicit or significant criticism during the inquiry 
proceedings or in the report, or in any interim report.
BEM patients would come under s 5(2)(b), whilst (a) and (c) would include such 
Trusts as Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust, Barking, Havering & Redbridge 
University Hospitals NHS Trust and University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust. 
These three Trusts have underserved patients from the South Asian community 
who had inflammatory bowel disease.72 In practice, core participants are often 
71 P Skelton, ‘The administration of an inquiry’ in J Beer, J Dingemans and R Lissack 
(eds), Public Inquiries (OUP 2011) 156.
72 Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Ethnic variations in the provision of biologic therapy for 
Crohn’s disease: a Freedom of Information study’ (n 11).
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organisations representative of individuals rather than individuals, themselves. In 
the case of patients this could present an additional hurdle related to medical 
confidentiality and s 5(1) specifies that a person can only be designated as a core 
participant: “provided that person consents to being so designated”.
The advantages of being a core participant have been summed up by Sir Brian 
Langstaff, chair of the Infected Blood Inquiry. The inquiry will:
engage with core participants on matters of practice and procedure which they 
will help to shape, and indeed will expect core participants to further the 
working of the Inquiry on an ongoing basis in ways that go beyond what it will 
ask of those who are not.73
Such views contrast with the status of infected patients who will simply “add 
to the Inquiry’s store of knowledge”.74 Core participants will be able to:
c. suggest lines of questioning (normally through their recognised legal 
representatives) to be pursued by Counsel to the Inquiry;
d. apply through their recognised legal representatives to the Chair to ask 
questions of witnesses during a hearing;
e. have access to the expert groups (through the Inquiry Secretariat) and be able 
to propose experts to be added to those groups;
f. be provided, prior to publication, with a copy of the report (or any interim 
report) which is to be published.75
Langstaff is clear about the importance of the term “significant” in s 5 (2) of The 
Inquiry Rules 2006. As other chairs of statutory public inquiries, Langstaff will 
decide who can have Core Participant status. Such a role will inevitably help shape 
the proceedings and outcome of any inquiry. Clearly, in any inquiry into under-
serving the BEM community the role of individual patient claimants will be 
limited. At best they will add to the narrative. The suggestion that organisations 
such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission will be able to act as Core 
Participants and speak on their behalf is undermined by its limited involvement 
with healthcare and unequal treatment related to protected characteristics. One of 
73 B Langstaff, ‘Chair’s statement of Intent on Care Participant Status’ (2018) 
<infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Chairs-Statement-of-Intent-
on-Core-Participant-Status-1.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
74 <infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk> accessed 7 May 2020.
75 B Langstaff, ‘Statement of Approach – Core Participant Status’ (2018) 
<infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Statement-of-Approach-Core-
Participant-Status-1.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
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the only examples of its involvement is related to hospitalised deaf patients.76 
Other potential Core Participants might include Monitor (now NHS Improvement), 
the Care Quality Commission, local Clinical Commissioning Groups and Health 
and Well-Being Boards as well as relevant Trusts. The track record of these organ-
isations as far as BEM communities being underserved is non-existent.
Monitor’s role was defined in the Health and Social Care (Community Health 
and Standards) Act 2003 as:
4 (b)  reducing inequalities between persons with respect to their ability to 
access those services, and
 (c)  reducing inequalities between persons with respect to the outcomes 
achieved for them by the provision of those services.
To date it has failed to publish any examples of having intervened to address 
inequalities in service delivery related to ethnicity. Similarly the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) has failed in this area. In describing its work the CQC stated 
its objectives were to “help to focus providers and commissioners on the impor-
tance of their responsibilities towards equality, diversity and human rights”, and to 
ensure that, “an organisation provides services proportionately to different groups 
and their needs”.77 However, it is yet to publish any outcomes of work on the health 
care of patients from the BEM community. Health and Well-Being Boards’ role is 
advisory representing local groups but lacking any enforceable powers. In contrast 
Clinical Commissioning Groups are directly responsible for the purchase of 
appropriate care for patients in their locality and so share responsibility with NHS 
Trusts for ensuring equitable access to services and treatment. The Public Sector 
Equality Duty identified in the Equality Act 2010 is the basis for the statement in 
the NHS Constitution that:
Legal duties require NHS England and each clinical commissioning group to 
have regard to the need to reduce inequalities in access to health services and 
the outcomes achieved for patients.78
76 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Section 23 Agreement between The Equality 
and Human Rights Commission and Tayside Health Board This Agreement 
(2014) <https://www.nhstaysidecdn.scot.nhs.uk/NHSTaysideWeb/idcplg?IdcService= 
GET_SECURE_FILE&Rendition=web&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased& 
noSaveAs=1&dDocName=prod_226503> (accessed 4 January 2021).
77 Care Quality Commission <cqc.org.uk/content/about-us> accessed 7 May 2020. 
78 Department of Health, ‘Guidance: The NHS Constitution for England’ (2015) <gov.uk/
government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england/the-nhs-constitution-for-
england> accessed 7 May 2020.
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Such organisations are likely to be Core Participants. Their financial weight 
will give them a significant advantage in presenting and defending their case 
compared to the charities concerned with inflammatory bowel disease. In 2016 
company accounts revealed that Crohn’s & Colitis UK had assets of £3 million 
with an annual expenditure of £1 million79 and charity returns for CICRA, the 
other self-help group, showed assets of £600,000 with an annual expenditure of 
£300,000.80 Should a pressure group emerge from the BEM community its funding 
will be dwarfed in comparison to NHS related organisations. Nevertheless, it 
would be essential that patients are directly represented so they can help formulate 
the direction of any inquiry and have all the advantages of being Core Participants.
6. Statutory Inquiries and Duties of Confidentiality
Any organisation accused of underserving the BEM community will claim the 
information needed to answer questions is protected by medical confidentiality.81 
However, Nicholas Lewis v Secretary of State for Health (defendant) & Michael 
Redfern QC (interested party)82 found that the public interest in disclosing medical 
records outweighed any interest in maintaining their confidentiality. A further 
significant issue when assessing differences in delivery of care would be the 
disclosure of records related to patients from the white community, who had 
received good quality of care. Only through such disclosures would it be possible 
to demonstrate underserving of one community compared to another.
7. Statutory Inquiries and Standard of Proof
To date, all academic publications on delivery of substandard care to BEM 
communities have involved case series, cohort or community based studies. They 
have demonstrated general attitudes rather than drilling down to individual cases. 
Clearly, any public inquiry into underserving of BEM communities would need to 
define the standard of proof which it would accept. To some degree this will be 
influenced by the possible consequences of an inquiry finding that there has been 
discrimination. The 2005 Act provides no guidance in this area of standard of 
79 Crohn’s and Colitis UK <beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05973370/filing-
history> accessed 7 May 2020.
80 CICRA <cicra.org/media/1336/annual-report-2018.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020. 
81 J Beer, ‘Evidence and Procedure’ in J Beer, J Dingemans and P Lissack, Public 
Inquiries (OUP 2011) 193.
82 [2008] EWHC 2196 (QB).
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proof.83 However, it needs consideration. For example, could such a finding be 
used as the basis for payment of compensation to individuals and families? In the 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry Saville L ducked the question, stating: “it seems to us that 
we can and should reach conclusions without being bound by rules designed for 
court cases, such as who has the burden of proof and the strict rules of evidence.”84 
The situation may be easier in an inquiry into underserving of BEM communities 
as this would be a civil issue and “balance of probabilities” would be the 
standard.
8.  Statutory Inquiries and the Consequences of Confirmation  
of Underserving BEM Communities
A statutory public inquiry can only make recommendations when required to do 
so by its Terms of Reference.85 However, even then there is no requirement that 
Parliament takes any action on them.86 From a patient’s perspective a statutory 
public inquiry could be disappointing – an expensive and prolonged investigation 
with results which they already knew leading to no change. In 2002 Walshe and 
Higgins reviewed the impact of all forms of inquiry on the NHS and concluded 
that:
The consistency with which inquiries highlight similar causes suggests that 
their recommendations are either misdirected or not properly implemented. 
Certainly there are few formal mechanisms for following up the findings and 
recommendations of inquiries. However, many of the problems identified by 
inquiries are cultural and demand changes in attitudes, values, beliefs, and 
behaviours—which are difficult to prescribe in any set of recommendations.87
There are no indications that the situation has improved and the need for 
changes in attitude remains a major stumbling block to reform. In the case of 
inflammatory bowel disease, publication of evidence of underserving of BEM 
83 J Aiken, ‘Inquiry reports and the duty to be fair’ in J Beer, J Dingemans and R Lissack, 
Public Inquiries (OUP 2011) 370. 
84 L Saville, ‘Standard of proof ruling’ (2004) para 18 <webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20101103103956/http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/rulings/tribunal/Archive/
proof.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
85 s 24(1)(a) Inquiries Act 2005.
86 Beer (n 27) 25.
87 K Walshe and J Higgins, ‘The use and impact of inquiries in the NHS’ (2002) 325 
British Medical Journal 895.
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communities has achieved nothing. For example, when asked through a Freedom 
of Information request what had been done, University Hospitals of Leicester NHS 
Trust replied complacently:
There is no intent within the Trust for there to be inequitable access by the 
South Asian Community and other community groups to treatment with 
biologics. Indeed, the service considers that as the population of Leicester has 
a white English minority with a very large South Asian presence, it would be 
both difficult and unlikely for there not to be equitable access to biologic 
therapy.88
In 2004 Sir Ian Kennedy, who chaired the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 
confirmed that once its report is delivered an inquiry “ceased to have any 
standing”.89 As a result there was no mechanism for formal review of whether 
recommendations had been implemented, a suggestion, which the Executive, 
failed to incorporate into the Inquiries Act 2005. However, Rough90 has pointed 
out that the more individuals who take part in the debate which surrounds an 
inquiry, the more difficult it becomes for the relevant industries, in this case the 
NHS, to insulate themselves from scrutiny.
NON-STATUTORY INQUIRIES
The decision whether an inquiry should be statutory or non-statutory is made after 
advice from the Cabinet Office Propriety and Ethics Team. In recent times 
non-statutory inquiries are held when matters of intelligence need to be consid-
ered in camera.91 Their relevance, therefore, to underserved BEM communities 
may be questioned. However, prior to the Inquiries Act 2005 they were a popular 
method of reviewing problems within the NHS.92 They continue to be used with a 
recent example being the investigation into the maternity and neonatal services at 
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust.93 The rationale 
88 University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust, Freedom of Information Request GB/
FOI/30912. 
89 I Kennedy, ‘Government by inquiry’ (2004) Question 654 <publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmpubadm/uc51-i/uc5102.htm> accessed 7 May 2020.
90 E Rough, ‘Policy learning through public inquiries? The case of UK nuclear energy 
policy 1955 – 61’ (2011) 29 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 24.
91 Caird (n 49) 6.
92 Walshe and Higgins (n 87) 895.
93 B Kirkup, Morecombe Bay Investigation (Stationery Office 2015) 1.
74
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO 
DISPARITIES IN THE DELIVERY OF CARE IN THE NHS
for the choice of a non-statutory inquiry is unclear, but it followed on from a failure 
by the CQC to identify and publish concerns about practices at the hospital. An 
earlier investigation by Grant Thornton had concluded:
on the evidence examined it seems that an attempt to cover-up matters 
concerning CQC’s regulation of UHMB may have taken place. The first 
improper action was the instruction to delete an important, internal report, 
which more likely than not, did occur.94
The issues at Morecombe Bay continued and one year after publication of his 
report, Kirkup was unhappy with the lack of progress.95 This is not surprising as a 
review by National Audit found that only 45 per cent of recommendations made 
by inquiries were adopted by the Executive.96
Clearly, should an inquiry ever happen into underserving of the BEM 
community by the NHS it would need to be a statutory one with none of it in 
camera. Even then based on previous inquiries, on the balance of probabilities, it 
is unlikely to have any long-term impact on delivery of care to this community.
1. Judicial Review and Healthcare for BEM Communities
Public law challenges to decisions within the NHS have been uncommon and 
often unsuccessful.97 One reason is the successful role of private law in the field of 
medical negligence, especially for after-the-event issues. However, public lawyers 
have contended that the courts have the capacity to play a more active role in 
‘refining the decision-making process, and consequently reducing any sense of 
unfairness and ultimately recourse to litigation’.98 During the second half of the 
20th century there has been a reorientation of judicial review away from the 
94 Grant Thornton, ‘The Care Quality Commission re: Project Ambrose’ (2013) <cqc.org.
uk/sites/default/files/media/documents/grant_thornton_uk_llp_morecambe_bay.pdf> 
accessed 13 January 2019. (This document can no longer be accessed but is referred to in 
many publications).
95 S Lintern, ‘Kirkup: Lack of progress since Morecambe Bay inquiry risks “disaster” ’ 
(2016) Health Services Journal. <https://www.hsj.co.uk/quality-and-performance/kirkup-
lack-of-progress-since-morecambe-bay-inquiry-risks-disaster/7002897.article> accessed 
4 January 2021. 
96 National Audit Office, ‘Investigation into government-funded inquiries’ (HC 836, 2017).
97 P Bibby, Effective Use of Judicial Review (Tolley Publishing Company 1995) 98.
98 R James and D Longley, ‘Judicial Review and Tragic Choices: Ex Parte B’ (1995) 367 
Public Law 373; A Parkin, ‘Allocating Health Care Resources in an Imperfect World’ 
(1985) 58 Modern Law Review 867.
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mediatory issues that had been the primary focus of the debate throughout the 
period leading up to the 1960s, towards a new and entirely ‘public’ task, namely, 
that of enforcing public duties.99 Pressure groups, representative bodies and statu-
tory organisations have liberal access to the courts for purposes of bringing 
proceedings in their own names or intervening as third parties in ongoing 
disputes.100 Indeed, during the last five years a number of Claimants have sought 
judicial review against the NHS as a whole or against delegated bodies. This is not 
surprising considering Laws LJ’s judgment in International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Home Secretary where individual rights were unqualified and the decisions taken 
had been made by unelected officials.101 This can give rise to controversy when 
judicial decision-making fringes upon matters of policy;102 the courts have noted 
that there can be merit in constraining decision makers even in those cases where 
no individual has been directly affected by a decision.103
JUDICIAL REVIEWS AND THE NHS
Topics have ranged from national contracts to individual concerns about current 
and future delivery of care. At times, the simple threat of action has resolved the 
problem. For example, in early 2018 the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
threatened action against 13 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) because of 
their Continuing Care policies on the basis that they were unlawful and breached 
the human rights of patients. The Commission’s concerns related to arbitrary caps 
on funding and failure to consider specific needs of individual patients. However, 
no action was taken as the CCGs convinced the Commission that they were revis-
ing their policies.104 In contrast, a number of pharmaceutical companies have 
99 TT Arvind and L Stirton, ‘The curious origins of judicial review’ (2017) 133 Law 
Quarterly Review 91.
100 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868; Re E 
(A Child) [2008] UKHL 66, [2009] 1 AC 536; for example, M Kirby, ‘Deconstructing the 
law’s hostility to public interest litigation’ (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 537.
101 [2003] QB 728, 765ff.
102 C Harlow, ‘Public law and popular justice’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 1.
103 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development 
Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386, 395 (Rose LJ); R v Somerset CC, ex p Dixon [1998] 
EnvLR 111, 121 (Sedley J); G Anthony, ‘Public interest and the three dimensions of 
judicial review’ (2013) 64 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 125.
104 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘NHS U-turns on discriminatory policies’ 
(2018) <equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-work/news/nhs-u-turns-discriminatory-policies> 
accessed 7 May 2020.
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sought judicial review when policies constrained use of their drugs, in particular 
when there was an expressed preference for the products of a rival company. In 
2018 Mrs Justice Whipple dismissed such an application in Bayer Plc and Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd against Various Clinical Commissioning Groups105 for 
their policies on which drugs should be used to treat Age-Related Macular Degen-
eration. There would appear to have been no cases where judicial review has been 
sought in relation to delivery of care by NHS Trusts. The NHS’s legal arm, NHS 
Resolution, reported only four cases where it acted as defendant, none of which 
concerned clinical care or involved NHS hospitals.106 Against this background it is 
important to consider whether discrimination experienced by BEM patients in the 
form of substandard clinical care might be dealt with through judicial review.
POLICIES AND DECISION MAKING IN THE NHS
In 1995 Bibby discussed how decisions were made within the NHS.107 Although 
policies were often published this was not always the case. There have been no 
suggestions of any written policies within certain NHS Trusts which would limit 
the number of South Asian patients receiving expensive biologic treatment or for 
any other form of discrimination against members of BEM communities. However, 
as Bibby suggested, there are occasions where the “existence of the policy is 
revealed only by analysis of the treatments actually given”.108 It was by such mech-
anisms that the under-treatment of inflammatory bowel disease amongst South 
Asian patients was first identified.109 The “policy” may simply reflect the fact that 
some clinicians show significant racial bias, believing BEM patients are less likely 
to adhere to treatment and take personal responsibility for management of their 
disease.110 It seems likely such attitudes may play a role in the underserving of 
patients with inflammatory bowel as they were seen less frequently by consultants, 
their management being left in the hands of junior doctors.111
105 [2018] EWHC 2465 (Admin).
106 NHS Resolution (2019) <resolution.nhs.uk/pca-judgements> accessed 7 May 2020.
107 Bibby (n 97) 98.
108 Bibby (n 97) 98.
109 Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Patients with ulcerative colitis from diverse populations: the 
Leicester experience’ (n 12); Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Ethnic variations in the provision of 
biologic therapy for Crohn’s disease: a Freedom of Information study’ (n 11).
110 NN Khosla and others, ‘A comparison of clinicians’ racial biases in the United States 
and France’ (2018) 206 Social Science & Medicine 31.
111 Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Patients with ulcerative colitis from diverse populations: the 
Leicester experience’ (n 12).
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CRITERIA FOR A JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AGAINST  
WHOM WOULD IT BE SOUGHT
54.1.1 of Civil Procedure Rules 1998 identifies:
the principal questions which arise when deciding whether it is appropriate to 
bring a claim by way of a claim for judicial review, are namely:
(1) Against which person or bodies does judicial review lie?
(2)  Is the measure, action or omission challenged one that is amenable to judi-
cial review?
(3) On what grounds does judicial review lie?
(4) Who can apply for judicial review?
Civil Procedure 54.1.2 states that such a person can seek review against “any 
person or body performing public duties or functions” and that a claim for judicial 
review includes: “54.1 (2)(a)(ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the 
exercise of a public function”.
The NHS Constitution sets out patients’ rights and pledged the NHS to 
achieving them. The first principle was that the NHS should provide “a 
comprehensive service available to all”.112
At the time the Lord Chancellor recognised that:
Many of the entitlements under the NHS and the duties incumbent on public 
authorities are legally enforceable through the mechanism of judicial review 
of executive action of Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts in 
England.113
However, many of the rights in the Constitution are more accurately considered 
as summations of multiple legal obligations arising from a range of sources. One 
112 Department of Health, ‘Guidance: The NHS Constitution’ (n 78).
113 Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rights and Responsibilities: 
Developing Our Constitutional Framework (Ministry of Justice, The Stationery Office 
2009) 44.
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purpose of the Constitution is to empower patients and as such it has singularly 
failed. In the Third Report on its impact in 2019 it was noted that:
In 2018, 19% of members of the public surveyed said that they had heard of 
the Constitution when prompted by a written description. This is a fall of 5% 
from the 2015 figure of 24% and an overall fall of 3% since 2009.114
In addition, the Court of Appeal has recognised in Coughlan115 that as demand 
will always outstrip resources the NHS may never provide a comprehensive 
service, but rather the Secretary of State and NHS England have a duty to promote 
such a service. Indeed, s2 of the Health Act 2009 only imposes a duty on NHS 
bodies to have regard to the NHS Constitution.
In R (Tracy) v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Trust116 Lord Dyson MR 
underlined that having regard to the constitution only required that commending a 
joint statement was sufficient. In the context of inequitable care for members of the 
BEM community it could, therefore, be argued that a commitment by an NHS 
Trust to equality as a target would be sufficient. In fact, Green J in R (Justice for 
Health) Ltd v Secretary of State for Health117 has described the duty to have regard 
to the NHS Constitution as a “target duty”. However, Green J in National Aids 
Trust v NHS England118 cited the Constitution as a “reinforcing factor” in reaching 
his conclusion that NHS England had misdirected itself in law. Such a use of the 
NHS Constitution has been made in other cases.119 Its use, therefore, in the context 
of purposive constructions of NHS bodies’ statutory and public law duties appears 
to be increasing.120
In the case of underserved patients from BEM communities judicial review 
would be sought against those Trusts where this was happening and against 
Clinical Commissioning Groups who dealt with them. Clinical Commissioning 
114 Department of Health and Social Care, Third Report on the Effect of the NHS 
Constitution (2019) 6 <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/770525/Statutory_report_on_NHS_Constitution_January_
for_2019.pdf> accessed 8 May 2020. 
115 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213, [2000] 2 
WLR 622, [2000] 3 All ER 850, 51 BMLR 1, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 306, 97 LGR 703.
116 [2014] EWCA Civ 822.
117 [2016] EWHC 2338 (Admin).
118 [2016] EWHC 2005 (Admin).
119 R (Rose) v Thanet CCG [2014] EWHC 1182 (Admin).
120 H Gibbs, ‘The purpose and effect of the NHS Constitution’ (2017) <landmarkchambers.
co.uk/resources/guide-to-the-law-of-the-nhs/> accessed 8 May 2020.
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Groups have replaced Primary Care Trusts as the bodies through which local 
health needs are met. Clearly, it would be inappropriate to take action directly 
against the NHS as a whole as many Trusts provide an appropriate level of 
service.121 Indeed in the case of inflammatory bowel disease six of the ten Trusts 
included in the study provided adequate care.
Trusts are required to collect data on ethnicity, admissions and procedures. 
This information is overseen by NHS Digital.122 Although Freedom of Information 
(FOI) requests are powerful tools for obtaining access to these data, responses are 
at the discretion of the local officer dealing with them and some claim that they do 
not collect such data as happened with Bradford.123 In addition, Bourke et al. have 
shown that FOI officers are more inclined to help applicants they know and consider 
friendly.124 It is unlikely that a patient or group concerned with underserving of the 
BEM community would fall into such a category.
IS THE OMISSION CHALLENGED AMENABLE  
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW?
English public law allows courts to control failures in the performance of public 
duties. s2 and s14 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which embody the right to life and 
not to experience discrimination, can form the basis for seeking judicial review (CPR 
54.1.9). In addition s6 specifies that it is unlawful for a public body to act in a way 
incompatible with a Convention Right. The Human Rights in Healthcare Programme 
of the NHS recognised the impact of the Act in 2011 when it published Guidance 
Notes which included the statement: “Policies and the practice of care should be 
non-discriminatory and pay particular attention to ensuring that standards are equally 
high for all individuals concerned.”125 It is of concern that the program was suspend-
ed in January 2013 because of lack of funding! Some nine years later its webpage 
states: “The programme is on hold (January 2013) until continuation funding is 
found.”126 There is no indication that this will happen and the program be revived.
121 Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Ethnic variations in the provision of biologic therapy for 
Crohn’s disease: a Freedom of Information study’ (n 11).
122 <digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information> accessed 7 May 2020.
123 Farrukh and Mayberry, ‘Ethnic variations in the provision of biologic therapy for 
Crohn’s disease: a Freedom of Information study’ (n 11).
124 G Bourke, B Worthy and R Hazell, Making Freedom of Information requests. A guide 
for academic researchers (University College, London, The Constitution Unit 2012) 7.
125 <humanrightsinhealthcare.nhs.uk/Library/az/Human_Rights_Survey_Hospital_
Patients_Guidance_Notes.pdf> accessed 17 January 2019. (site not secure on 7 May 2020).
126 <.humanrightsinhealthcare.nhs.uk/About-Us/default.aspx> accessed 7 May 2020.
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ARE THERE GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW?
The European Convention on Human Rights does not specifically refer to health 
issues. However, there have been cases which confirm that they can be considered. 
For example, in Turkey v Cyprus the Court reviewed access to health care but held 
that “no violation of Article 2 of the Convention has been established by reason of 
an alleged practice of denying access to medical services to Greek Cypriots and 
Maronites living in northern Cyprus”.127 In considering how Turkey dealt with its 
own nationals in Șentűrk & Șentűrk v Turkey the Court:
reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain 
from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps 
to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. These principles apply also 
to the area of public health …. It cannot be excluded that the acts and omissions of 
the authorities in the context of public-health policies may, in certain circumstances, 
engage their responsibility under the substantive limb of Article 2.128
The Court has begun to recognise the right of access to healthcare and that it 
should be of a certain quality. Following on from Atiman v Turkey the Court made 
it clear that Article 2 was not restricted to cases where there had been a death but 
also “where the alleged victim had not died as a result of the impugned conduct”.129 
Such cases are a significant movement towards “more substantive justiciable 
protection” for underserved patients.130 Clearly the underserving of BEM patients 
would be an omission that could be brought forward for judicial review. In contrast 
to the care concerning Greek Cypriots and Maronites in Northern Cyprus the 
evidence for reduced access to healthcare is robust.
The Equality Act 2010 and the public sector equality duty (PSED) make it 
incumbent on the NHS to deliver equal care to all sectors of British society and this 
has been recognised in the advice it gives: ‘Members of the public could seek judicial 
review of a breach of the PSED by either the Health Body or the third party.’131
127 Turkey v. Cyprus App no 25781/94 (ECtHR, 2001) para 221.
128 Mehmet Șentűrk & Bekir Șentűrk v. Turkey App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 2013).
129 Atiman v. Turkey App no 62279/09 (ECtHR, 2014). 
130 L Graham, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the emerging right to health’ 
(2017) Oxford Human Rights Hub <ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-european-court-of-human-
rights-and-the-emerging-right-to-health> accessed 7 May 2020. 
131 NHS Centre for Equality and Human Rights, The Public Sector Equality Duty and 
Third Party Service Providers (2012) <wales.nhs.uk/equality> accessed 7 November 
2018. (No longer available).
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WHO COULD APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW  
OF REDUCED ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE?
Any person or legal person applying for judicial review of underserving of South 
Asian patients will need to demonstrate that they have standing. Section 31 (3) of 
the Senior Courts Act 1981 states that “the applicant has a sufficient interest in the 
matter to which the application relates”.
CPR 54.1.11 recognises that if a claimant has a direct personal interest in the 
outcome of a claim this would be sufficient. In recent years a liberal attitude has 
been taken towards public interest groups representing communities or issues. 
Essentially the court makes its assessment through a two-stage process:
1. At the permission stage the claimant must show he has sufficient interest.
2. At the substantive hearing claimants must demonstrate they have “sufficient 
interest to maintain their claim for a particular remedy”. (CPR 54.1.11)
Interestingly, the applicant need not personally have experienced adverse conse-
quences of a government body decision, but simply be at ‘risk of being directly 
affected’.132 However, with under-delivery of care to a whole community it might 
be argued that if the applicant had himself received poor care this was a matter for 
private law and so outside the scope of judicial review. In recent cases when this 
distinction was unclear, the trend has been to commence proceedings.133
Patients from the BEM community could base their application on a Trust’s 
failure to fulfil a legitimate expectation. Their treatment had been simply unfair. 
In R v Devon County Council ex p Baker Brown L stated:
the claimant’s right will only be found established when there is a clear and 
unambiguous representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. 
Then the administrator or other public body will be held bound in fairness 
by the representation made unless only its promise or undertaking as to how 
its power would be exercised is inconsistent with the statutory duties imposed 
upon it.134
Equality in delivery of health care falls squarely within this definition.
The discovery of discrimination in delivery of care has arisen out of academic 
research, but this has not excluded administrative courts giving guidance to 
132 Norris v Ireland App no 10581/83 (ECtHR, 1988).
133 H Southey and others, Judicial Review: A Practical Guide (LexisNexis 2017) 214.
134 [1995] 1 All ER 73.
82
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO 
DISPARITIES IN THE DELIVERY OF CARE IN THE NHS
decision-makers. This was often through obiter remarks but also included granting 
individuals’ relief.135
During the last 20 to 30 years declarations have frequently been sought by 
NHS Trusts to allow them to withdraw life support from patients; a declaration 
requiring a Trust to deliver equality of care would carry equal weight and 
equivalent newsworthiness.136 Although remedies granted to successful claimants 
are normally non-coercive declarations that public authorities are trusted to 
respect, where the BEM community has been shown to be underserved it is to be 
hoped that the court would issue a Mandatory Order and require the Trust to 
remedy its decision-making processes and comply with its statutory duties. Indeed, 
work by Platt et al. on local authorities has shown that “increases in challenge 
appear to be connected to improvements in quality scores, and are not simply the 
consequence of lawyers making work for themselves. The findings provide a 
quantitative basis for arguing that judicial review challenges may contribute to 
improvements in local government services and therefore that the effect of judicial 
review is neither insignificant nor wholly negative”.137 
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
IN RESPONDING TO UNDERSERVING OF  
THE BEM COMMUNITY
There are several issues which limit the potential role of judicial review in this 
area. According to CPR 1998 r54.5 a claim form must be filed “not later than 
3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”. However, those grounds 
might not be recognised for a considerable time and then only through a Freedom 
of Information request. Such a request should be dealt within 20 working days, 
although the Information Commissioner can allow extensions of up to 40 days.138 
135 Southey and others (n 133).
136 D Sokol, ‘Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James: Best Interests 
and Futility under the Judicial Microscope’ (2013) Journal of Medical Ethics <blogs.bmj.
com/medical-ethics/2013/11/14/aintree-university-hospital-nhs-foundation-trust-v-james-
best-interests-and-futility-under-the-judicial-microscope> accessed 7 May 2020.
137 L Platt, M Sunkin and K Calvo, ‘Judicial review litigation as an incentive to change in 
local authority public services in England and Wales’ (2009) ISER Working Paper Series, 
No 2009-05, 16 <https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/iser_working_papers/2009-05.pdf> 
accessed 7 May 2020.
138 ICO, Time Limits for Compliance under the Freedom of Information Act (Section 10) 
<ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1165/time-for-compliance-foia-guidance.
pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
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For an individual patient who has received substandard care which caused him 
injury the case would come under private law and compensation would need to be 
sought under the tort of negligence. Even though costs can be limited through a 
Protective Cost Order, they are likely to be a factor-limiting individuals and pres-
sure groups taking action.
Possible Actions by BEM Patients Under the Tort of Negligence
Where an individual has received sub-standard care which has caused him or 
her harm then an action under the tort of negligence would be likely to succeed 
and should form the basis for advice given to a client/patient. However, for 
family and others who know BEM patients, who have received sub-standard 
care, it is appropriate to consider whether there might be grounds for seeking 
compensation under the criteria laid out for nervous shock in Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police.139 They are that: relatives must have a 
relationship of love and affection with the primary victim, have direct percep-
tion of the event with unaided senses, as well as have proximity to the event or 
its immediate aftermath and experienced psychological injury via a single 
nervous shock.
The distinction between the incident at Hillsborough which was sudden, fatal 
and public and the chronic illness of someone with inflammatory bowel disease is 
clear. However, close family members, in particular, will perceive the on-going 
events of sub-standard care and will be in close proximity to the aftermath of such 
poor care. Nevertheless in Alcock the judges defined an event as a single incident 
which occurred at a single moment in time, so excluding potential claims by 
families of chronically underserved patients.
The issue as to whether there can be sufficient proximity when there is a 
significant gap between a breach and any consequent injury has not been adequately 
addressed. This would be the case where a patient experienced significant injury 
because of chronic under management of his disease.140 However, this view is not 
supported by Sion v Hampstead Health Authority141 where a father watched his 
son gradually deteriorate and die over 14 days due to hospital negligence. The case 
was struck out by Staughton LJ on the basis that “the report describes a process 
139 [1991] UKHL 5.
140 J De Bono, ‘Nervous shock and delayed injury’ (2018) <ukhealthcarelawblog.co.uk/
rss-feed/91-nervous-shock-and-delayed-injury> accessed 7 May 2020.
141 (1994) EWCA Civ 26.
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continuing for some time, from first arrival at the hospital to the appreciation of 
medical negligence after the inquest”.142
On 13 October 2015 Andy McDonald attempted to address these issues 
through a Private Members Bill, which proposed that it was not a condition of the 
claim’s success that the illness was induced by a shock, or that the claimant was 
close in time and space to the act or omission which causes the death, injury or 
imperilment of the immediate victim.143 However, the Negligence and Damages 
Bill failed due to ending of the Parliamentary Session.
Overall, however, the courts and judicial review are increasingly retracing the 
reasoning processes of public bodies so as to ensure that decisions were not made 
in an arbitrary or thoughtless way – something which is true of inequitable delivery 
of care.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Recently David Williams, Professor of Public Health at Harvard, asked: “How is 
it possible that people with good intentions seeking to do their best can nonethe-
less, at an aggregate level, create a pattern of care that is so discriminatory?”144 He 
went on to say: “Our answer was implicit bias. It’s also called unconscious or 
unthinking discrimination”.145 When such attitudes are widespread in an organisa-
tion it leads to “institutional racism” as defined by MacPherson in The Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry.146 Most attempts to deal with such issues have been outside of 
the UK, in countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and 
largely dealt with the problems of indigenous minorities rather than migrant 
communities. They have largely been concerned with education and attempting to 
change the ethos of hospitals or public health services. It is now more than 50 
years since Dr King made his plea for equality in healthcare. It was recently 
suggested that it may well be a further 50 years before it becomes a reality in the 
142 ibid.
143 Negligence and Damages HC Bill (2015–16) <publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/
cbill/2015-2016/0076/15076.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020.
144 Harvard Institute for Healthcare Improvement, ‘Does Racism Play a Role in Health 
Inequities?: A Conversation Between Donald Berwick, MD, and David R. Williams, PhD, 
MPH’ (2018) <ihi.org/Documents/OpenSchoolCourseTranscripts/David-Williams-Don-
Berwick-Does-Racism-Play-A-Role-In-Health-Inequities.htm> accessed 7 May 2020.
145 ibid.
146 Home Office, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (n 19).
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USA.147 The contention of this paper is that education and social programs have 
failed. Therefore, different approaches are needed. For individuals there can be 
redress through the courts for negligent care, but the issue is wider affecting whole 
communities and so requiring a broader approach. Such an approach would need 
to investigate both the causes of the problem, as well as its magnitude, and suggest 
methods by which the issue can be addressed.
Despite clear, published, widespread evidence that patients from BEM 
communities are underserved, this discrimination is recognised within the NHS 
by very few and there has been no co-ordinated and effective program to address 
the issue. The fact that the Human Rights in Healthcare Programme has been 
suspended for more than six years, because of lack of funding, emphasises the 
complacency within government and the NHS. This same culture also responds to 
other medical scandals with a similar complacency or, perhaps, indifference. 
Despite many recommendations from numerous inquiries across a number of 
medical areas the same issues regarding sub-standard care recur. The recent 
scandals at Morecombe Bay and Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust identified 
lack of staff, poor training, defective equipment and an inability to recognise that 
things had gone wrong as major components to the defective care provided by 
these Trusts. In the case of Morecombe Bay there was also evidence of a deliberate 
cover-up by the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which is the statutory body 
which should monitor performance. The situation with regard to discrimination in 
the delivery of care is no different. Trusts, Clinical Commissioning Groups and 
monitoring bodies, such as CQC and NHS Improvement, have failed to respond to 
published evidence of discrimination in the delivery of care. For these organisations 
education has had no impact and the Equality and Human Rights Commission has 
seldom involved itself on behalf of patients. The only approach likely to have any 
impact will be a legal one with individuals and institutions identified and held 
responsible for their actions.
The advantage of judicial review would be that individuals and institutions 
could be named and ordered to fulfil their statutory duties and deliver equitable 
care to the BEM community. However, it would deal with the issues on a case-by-
case basis and only with time hopefully help change the culture across the NHS. A 
statutory inquiry could also require the attendance of witnesses and the disclosure 
of documents, but would be unable to enforce its recommendations and many 
would be concerned that the controlling hand of the Executive might lead to the 
effective suppression of evidence.
147 D Munro, ‘The 50th anniversary of Dr King’s healthcare quote’ Forbes (25 March 
2016). 
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Although a Royal Commissions lacks coercive powers, because of its nature it 
is prestigious. As with Statutory Inquiries it cannot institute legal action against 
offenders, but its inquiries can be wide ranging and it should be free of political 
control once active. Unlike non-statutory inquiries its report will not be “lost” 
from the public arena. As Saatchi has argued, it is only through the “independence 
and thoroughness” of a Royal Commission that there can be a “sustainable policy 
change in the NHS”148 and so reverse its institutional racism. However, on an 
individual basis, BEM patients who have received sub-standard care need to look 
at more traditional routes to seek redress and that must be through actions in the 
tort of negligence.
148 Saatchi (n 45) 29.
